The Revival of the Iran Nuclear Deal - Implications on the Gulf's Security?

On March 17 Wikistrat hosted a webinar that discussed the implications of a renewed US engagement with Iran for the Gulf States. The webinar deliberated how a return to the JCPOA might impact the Gulf States and regional stability in the Gulf, what the US role in the Middle East should be in this context, and how US-Iran talks might impact the Gulf States' relations with Iran.

Participants:

• Dr. Raz Zimmt, Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) ;

• Dr. Kristian Ulrichsen, Baker Institute Fellow for the Middle East;

• Dr. Sebastian Sons, Researcher at the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient Institute in Bonn, Germany;

• Dr. Annelle Sheline, Research Fellow for the Middle East at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

The event was moderated by Adam Hoffman, Head of Middle East Desk at Wikistrat, and Dr. Rebecca Molloy, Director of Wikistrat's Middle East Community.

Listen here:

Transcript

Adam Hoffman, Head of Middle East Desk: Welcome, everyone. Thank you for joining us at this event. This is a Wikistrat webinar on the revival of the Iran Nuclear Deal - implication for the Gulf’s security. This is part of a series of webinars that we do at Wikistrat, focusing on the Middle East and the Gulf. And we're very happy to see all of you here with us today. I'm honored to be joined by a panel of distinguished speakers, focusing each on their particular areas of expertise, on the Gulf or on Iran itself.

In this panel, we have Dr. Raz Zimmt who is an Iran expert and research fellow at The Institute for National Security Studies at Tel-Aviv. He will be moderating this discussion, the panel itself, and also presenting, at the outset, Iran's perspective on these new developments. We also have here Dr. Kristian Ulrichsen, a long-time member of our experts community, an expert on the Gulf, and a Baker Institute fellow for the Middle East who is joining us from Austin, Texas. We have Dr. Sebastian Sons, who is a researcher in DGAP's Middle East and North Africa program, and an expert on Saudi Arabia. We also have with us Dr. Annelle Sheline, a research fellow in the Middle-East program at the Quincy Institute in DC, focusing on the Gulf states. And finally, we have Dr. Rebecca Molloy who is the director of the Middle East community at Wikistrat, and she will be moderating the Q&A part of this event.

Dr. Raz Zimmt: Thank you, Adam. Good evening, it's a pleasure to be here tonight. Well, I was asked by Adam to give a short introduction concerning the Iranian perspective, which is a little weird for an Israeli to present the Iranian perspective, but I have a sense that perhaps I became too pro-Iranian so Adam thought I could present the Iranian perspective as well, which is good.

Let me just say at the beginning that as we discuss the revival of the Iran Nuclear Deal, I have to say that I'm not so sure that a return to the JCPOA is going to be that simple. And although it seems that both sides, both the Biden administration and the government in Iran, it seems that they want to go back to the JCPOA, I have to say that I'm not confident that the debate going on right now over the so-called sequence between Iran and United States is just tactical or technical. It seems more serious than that.

And to quote just a few hours ago, tweets published by Ali Shamkhani, the Secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council. He tweeted just a few hours ago saying in response to a statement given yesterday by the French foreign minister. So Shamkhani said, "Nothing will happen unless the United States takes effective actions to lift their oppressive sanctions."

And he also said, "The current stalemate is not tactical or domestic as the French foreign minister said yesterday, but related to the West’s deceptive strategy." What I think is very clear at this point is that Iran is not going to give up at least two of its positions. One is Iran's readiness to go back to compliance, only if the United States is ready to go back to the JCPOA and remove sanctions. So, this is the first position, a very clear position taken by Iran. And the second Iranian position is that the JCPOA is not going to be renegotiated. So, whereas a foreign minister Zarif said, "We should not sell one horse again and we are not buying one horse again."

Meaning we are not going to discuss the JCPOA again, at least until both sides decide to go back to the original JCPOA. But I think what makes one even more concerned when it comes to the current situation, is that even in issues in which one could perhaps expect Iran to show some flexibility, for example, Iran's readiness for a step by step return to the JCPOA, or its readiness to go back to indirect talks with the United States before sanctions relieved. Even on those issues, it doesn't seem right now that Iran is going to compromise. We've had some contradictory statements going from Iran over the last few weeks.

But it makes you wonder whether the Iranian position right now is really an issue of tactical negotiation strategy, whether it has to do with political considerations, especially from the Supreme Leader, Khamenei, who might not want to go back to the JCPOA before the upcoming elections in June in Iran, so that it won't be attributed to the Rouhani pragmatic camp in Iran. Or whether it is really a strategic decision made by Superior Leader Khamenei not to go back to the JCPOA, perhaps because of the lack of trust in the United States, especially after Trump's decision to withdraw from the JCPOA.

And I have to remind you what Khamenei said again, and again, it's better to neutralize the sanctions rather to remove the sanctions. So, I'm not saying Iran is not going to go back to the JCPOA, but I think we have to take this option as one possibility. But as our main focus today and our discussion today is the regional issues, I would like to make some points concerning the Iranian perspective over the region and perhaps the missiles issue. So, the first question is whether Iran's going to be ready to go back to what Biden considers to be a stronger and longer JCPOA. And by that, I don't mean the nuclear issue which I leave aside, but I mean taking the two other issues, which are the long-range missiles and the regional activity of Iran, and discuss and address those issues in addition to the nuclear issue.

Well, I personally believe that it will be very difficult to address other issues in the near future. It will definitely demand Iran to try and overcome this huge wall of distrust with regard to the United States. So, I wouldn't rule out a possibility, but in the future, if there is a return to the JCPOA, Iran is going to be willing to discuss other issues, but it probably won't happen in the next future.

The second point I would like to say concerns the issue of the missiles which of course is the main, major concern, both for Israel and for the Gulf States in the region here. Again, I can't be too optimistic. I think it is very unlikely that Iran is going to be ready to discuss its missile capability. Some would argue that Iran would be ready to discuss its missile's capability if other regional players, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the UAE are going to be ready to discuss their missile capabilities as well.

I personally believe it will be even more complicated because Iran really considers its missile program as the main deterrence against possible aggression. So, as I usually say to Israeli colleagues, if you expect Iran to give up its missile capabilities, you should perhaps expect Israel to give up its own. So that's the comparison. So even if Iran agrees to discuss its missiles, I think that at the most we should expect Iran to discuss the range of the missiles which is no solution to the original players in the Middle East.

Now, I would like to make five short points before moving to our experts considering the regional issue. My first point is that I think when it comes to the JCPOA and to the regional Iranian activity, we should perhaps separate between Iran's regional policy, which has to do with the so-called maximum resistance strategy Iran adopted since summer or spring of 2019, a year after Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA. And by that, I mean, all those provocative actions carried out by Iran in the Persian Gulf, such as the sabotage of oil tankers in the region, the attack against Saudi Arabia.

So, this is part of the so-called, malign Iranian regional policy, which has certainly linked to the JCPOA. And if the JCPOA is renewed, and if both sides will go back to the JCPOA, then perhaps there is a possibility to lower the tension in a way that will prevent some of those actions. But I think that most Iranian regional activity has almost nothing to do with the JCPOA. So, when you look at what Iran has been doing in Syria, or Iraq, or Yemen, or its connections to the Palestinian Islamic organization, it has nothing to do with the JCPOA. It has to do with the well-known traditional strategy of Iran of becoming a regional power, or as some would say, trying to increase not just its influence, but perhaps even its hegemony in the region. So, I think that even if the JCPOA is restored, one should not expect Iran to give up what was before the Islamic revolution of 1979.

My second remark or point is that we should all remember that in the Iranian perspective, the United States cannot be part of the regional negotiations. I mean, Iran considers the United States as part of the problem, not as part of the solution. So, the United States will not be allowed in the Iranian position to be part of any kind of regional negotiations. It can be a partner perhaps for nuclear discussions, not for regional discussions.

The third point is that Israel of course cannot be part of any kind of regional talks with Iran. Iran does not even recognize the state of Israel, but I would say that it is even more complicated because it's not just that Iran is not willing to discuss anything with Israel, it will probably not discuss anything that is of Israeli concern. So even if Iran is ready to discuss issues such as Yemen, such as Iraq, which are more relevant to other players in the region, it will certainly not negotiate, for example, its support for Hezbollah or perhaps even its military advancements in Syria, or it's support for Hamas the PIJ in Gaza.

So, this is another, I would say an elephant in the room we have to take into consideration. My fourth point is that even if Iran agrees to have talks over the regional issues, it will probably demand to discuss not just the so-called Iranian activity or the Iranian influence in the region, but the influence of other players in the region. So, the Iranian position has always been, if you want to discuss Yemen, that's fine with us, but we should discuss not just the Iranian support for the Houthis in Yemen, but also what the Saudis have been doing in Saudi Arabia. If we want to discuss the Iranian activity in Iraq, that's fine, but let's discuss what Turkey has been doing in Northern Iraq, what the Saudis are doing in Iraq. So that might make things more complicated.

And my last point, and perhaps this is the most important point. If we take into consideration all those Iranian positions, that raises the question, whether it is possible and whether it is advisable to even discuss regional issues as part of the JCPOA or in parallel to the JCPOA? Is it possible for example, to force Iran into giving up some of its activities? Much of it is carried out by proxies, not directly by Iran. I have to say I'm quite a skeptic about that. It doesn't mean of course that there are no ways to influence Iranian activities in the region. Israel has been doing that in Syria. There are ways to do that in Iraq, not just by military force, but also by perhaps giving Iraq or Syria alternatives to Iranian economic and political, and military influence.

But I'm not sure that discussing those issues diplomatically, is the best way to enforce the objectives of the regional players in the region. I think I'll leave it with that, and now I would like to address our dear experts here in the panel and raise a few questions.

The first question I would like to raise, concerns the Gulf states regarding the new possible nuclear agreement between the West and Iran and how the Biden administration should address those concerns when re-engaging with Iran. Annelle, could we start with you?

Dr. Annelle Sheline: Sure. Thanks so much. It's really a pleasure to be here. And I appreciate your kicking us off with your opening comments. So maybe before I turn to that, I just wanted to respond to a couple of the points you made. So, in general, I do agree with your point that it won't be necessarily simple to return to the JCPOA as we've observed. And I'm sitting here in Washington, D.C. Sort of my perspective is that it has been fairly disappointing for myself and for other progressive Americans who were really heartened that on the campaign trail Biden, as well as all of the democratic candidates, agreed that returning to the JCPOA was a core objective. So, remaining hopeful that that will take place. But I agree with you that it's clearly not simple.

I also really appreciated your point about trying to think from Iran's perspective about the demand of giving up its missiles, how that would look from an Israeli perspective, for example, or from an American perspective.

And I also really agreed with your point that the US cannot be part of negotiations, not only this would be a non-starter for Iran, but as we've observed elsewhere, given that the US remains the global military hegemon, when the US is involved in essentially anything, but especially in matters, for example, if there was going to be efforts to try to negotiate some kind of security arrangement among the regional powers, if the US is involved, it would lead it. And I know we have a question later where we're going to get into that a little bit more directly about the lack of success in trying to establish some kind of regional security architecture for the Middle East. So again, I just wanted to thank you for those points.

So, to get to the first question about the main concerns of the Gulf states, regarding a new nuclear agreement between the West and Iran. So essentially, the current balance of power in the region is somewhat artificially inflated in favor of states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. As you mentioned, there is this concern about Iran sort of becoming a regional power. And the fact that Iran at present, their economy is about the size of the economy of the American state of New Jersey, this is artificial that Iran is in fact a large, populous, and resource-rich country. And so, the fact that it continues to be sort of throttled as a result of US actions, American sanctions, et cetera, this is an unsustainable sort of balance of power. And so, I would argue this contributes to the instability that we see here.

So, while I do understand that Gulf states are concerned about the thought that they might lose in sort of a balance of power that shifts in favor of Iran, I think that they are currently losing as a result of the violence and instability that comes about from this sort of artificial inflation of their power as a result of US military partnerships. So, in terms of how the Biden administration should address their concerns, I would argue that this is the wrong question to ask, at least from an American perspective, that for too long American policy has focused on trying to reassure the Gulf states when really the Biden administration should be focused on the interests of the American people.

And for example, we saw that under President Obama, when in the midst of some sort of effort to negotiate the JCPOA, there were concerns about needing to reassure Saudi Arabia, for example, that the US was still committed to their security. And so, as a result, the Obama administration did not push back when Saudi Arabia invaded Yemen, and half a million Yemenis have died as a result of that war and the subsequent instability, structural factors starvation happening there.

So clearly it doesn't necessarily work very well to try to reassure the Gulf states, again, to reinforce this sort of artificial sense of their own power, which is primarily the result of the American military presence in the region, as well as massive amounts of weapons sales, and the ongoing transfer of military aid, primarily to Israel, as well as to Egypt, the two largest recipients of military aid, as well as Jordan. So, I think in the future, moving forward, there are concerns from American foreign policy experts about this notion of Iran. We clearly saw under the Trump administration, the overwhelming focus on Iran as an alleged threat.

And this, again, in my reading, is also an artificially inflated threat. It is a multipolar region. The US can trust this, that none of the powers in the region are going to be able to sort of assert overwhelming military hegemony. And that moving forward, just to reiterate here, I very much agree that Biden shouldn't take the perspective of trying to reassure the Gulf states. I think where we tend to see a reduction of tensions is when the US has a smaller presence in the region, or for example, after the attacks on the oil facility in Saudi Arabia, when the Trump administration's response was quite muted, that was when we saw Saudi officials or sort of back-channel Saudi outreach to Iran to try to tone down tensions.

Whereas once, for example, after the killing of Soleimani, when the Saudis were reassured that the US was going to potentially fight Iran on their behalf, then we started to see a lot more of this sort of aggressive rhetoric. So just to reiterate your point, that I think Biden needs to take a back seat here and allow the regional countries to work this out for themselves. I'll stop there.

Dr. Raz Zimmt: Just as a short follow-up. Do you think that the United States should reduce even further its military presence in Syria and Iraq?

Dr. Annelle Sheline: Yes. Absolutely. I mean, the justification for being in Syria was to combat ISIS and ISIS has been militarily defeated, if not ideologically, but the United States cannot maintain a military presence in every part of the world where people are ideologically opposed to it. In fact, I think we would find less ideological opposition to the United States if the US had a much smaller military presence in general. So, the US needs to be out of Syria, in a responsible way, not the way that Trump sort of announced in October of 2019 that he would simply pull out and then decided he wasn't going to do that.

It needs to be done in a way that is responsible. But again, it shouldn't be based on necessarily stability milestones, because then you have actors in the region who would be incentivized to exacerbate instability in order to prevent the US from leaving. So, I absolutely agree that the US needs to get out of Iraq and Syria and to have a much smaller military presence in the region in general.

Dr. Raz Zimmt: Thank you, Annelle. Sebastian, what is your take on the concerns of the Gulf states and what Biden should or shouldn't do regarding those concerns?

Dr. Sebastian Sons: Thank you very much. And first of all, thank you very much for the invitation. I'm really much looking forward to the discussion and I'm very sorry because I had some technical difficulties here in the not very well digitalized heart of Germany. So I was not able to listen to everything that Annelle said, so I hope I will not repeat what she has said already.

Dr. Raz Zimmt: But perhaps in the meantime, we could skip to Kristian. Hopefully, your link is better. Sorry for that. Could you address my question, please?

Dr. Kristian Ulrichsen: Okay. Thank you very much for the invitation. I hope you can all hear me. In terms of the Gulf states and building on what Annelle was saying, I think we also should distinguish between or among the Gulf states as well. I mean, there's no Gulf consensus in as much as you have the blocks one in Saudi, UAE, Bahrain to some extent. And the other, again, not a full-on block per se, but cut out Kuwait and Oman which put more emphasis on diplomatic outreach and engagement. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, for example, see Iran as much of a threat to domestic security because of their own Shia communities in ways that the other countries in the Gulf don't necessarily do. And we also saw quite a neat split among the Gulf states over Biden's election broadly speaking. Reactions in Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman were favorable, certainly more so than responses initially in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Bahrain. So, there's no real Gulf consensus on this.

Dr. Sebastian Sons: Bahrain's tremendously under pressure. Not only when it comes to the security situation, but also when it comes to the relations with Joe Biden. I don't think I have to go into details here. We all know that the situation with the U.S. is under strain and that the pressure that is exerted on the Saudi leadership with regards to Yemen, with regards to the human rights record, with regards to the release of the Khashoggi report is intensifying. And of course, regional stability or regional instability also has negative implications for the Saudi business role models. So Saudi Arabia is in dire need of foreign investment. Mohammad bin Salman, the Crown Prince, wants to foster socio-economic transformation in terms of tourism, in terms of entertainment, in terms of creating a new hub in the region. And without regional stability...

Dr. Kristian Ulrichsen: Well, I was going to then add that the Biden administration does to some extent have a dilemma in the sense that if it does include Gulf States in negotiations for whatever comes next, not certainly is that separate from the JCPOA which deliberately set aside regional issues so that they couldn't get to a nuclear agreement on a more narrowly focused set of issues. But then, who among the Gulf States do you include? And there's a risk then that's like putting say the Saudis or the Iraqis, you then create discourse among the other Gulf States who also perhaps would like a seat at the table. So, then you include the Gulf cooperation council, the GCC, which at least now is led by a Kuwaiti secretary-general, who is more of a balancing actor than what we saw in the 2017 to January 2021 period when the GCC itself was hopelessly split between these two camps.

So, I think there had to be quite capital considerations as to who we included if any further engagement is decided to include any Gulf States in negotiations while agreeing of course, with about some of the voting points, kind of U.S. Gulf relationships. But I mean, in terms of including some States and not others, this has the potential to exacerbate some of the regional dynamics and of course, Kuwait and Qatar, and Oman have at least a potential to be facilitators of back-channel dialogues. And I think that's already happening to some extent with all countries offering their services to the U.S. So I guess engaging in different ways is an option and not necessarily having a seat at the table, but that again would then create problems in Saudi Arabia and in Abu Dhabi, which would demand a seat at the table, probably Israel as well. So again, there's no easy answer here.

Raz Zimmt: Thank you. And I see Sebastian is back. So, I'm afraid that we miss some of your answers. Can you hear me, Sebastian?

Dr. Sebastian Sons: Yes, I can hear. I'm really sorry for that. Yeah. As you might know, Germany, when it comes to digitalization is maybe not the most advanced country in the world. So, I'm really sorry for that. I don't know what part you have missed and maybe we can also continue or what do you suggest?

Dr. Raz Zimmt: You can always blame the Iranians. But let's move to the next question, please. And what are the implications in your view of a new nuclear agreement with Iran for regional stability, especially for the Gulf States?

Adam Hoffman, Head of Middle East Desk: May I suggest we start with Sebastian this time, so we make sure we'll get your response?

Dr. Sebastian Sons: Yes, of course. So, when it comes to the Gulf States, when it comes specifically to Saudi Arabia, a new nuclear agreement with Iran is, on one hand, a big challenge as I've tried to explain before, but it's also a chance because Saudi Arabia is in a very sensitive situation at the moment due to the fact that its national security is under threat. When we take into consideration that the good Houthis are launching missiles and drones on Saudi soil on almost a daily level, they're targeting sensitive...

Dr. Raz Zimmt: I'm afraid we lost you again. Can you hear me, Sebastian? Again, if you want, perhaps you should try to give up the camera. At least we can hear you perhaps. Well, I'm afraid we'll have to go to Annelle with this question, or I'm not afraid to. Okay. Annelle, could you address this question as well?

Dr. Annelle Sheline: Yes. So, in terms of the implications of a new nuclear agreement with Iran for regional stability specifically for the Gulf States, it does confuse me somewhat why states like Saudi Arabia and Israel seem more interested in Iran remaining isolated than in preventing it from acquiring a nuclear weapon. If these countries were so terrified of the threat posed by Iran, they should be demanding that U.S. returned to the nuclear deal immediately so then Iran, according to its own statements, would then come back into compliance with the terms of the deal. So, it seems fairly clear that that states like Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the UAE, as well as Bahrain and Egypt, and sort of Kuwait, are more interested in a nuclear-armed Iran than they are in having an Iran that is more integrated into the regional economy, the global economy, and therefore would threaten them.

And so, I can understand that from their perspective, they see a more integrated Iran as threatening their sort of influence in the region. But in general, I do think that the whole world would be better off with fewer nuclear-armed powers. I mean, these states already spend inordinate amounts of their own budgets on the military, on buying weapons that are often unnecessary, fancy planes that they, in the case of Saudi Arabia, can't even necessarily fly themselves without the help of the United States. And all of these countries, particularly the Gulf States, are in an untenable economic position.

Particularly states like Saudi Arabia that have a large population frustrated by lack of opportunity. Clearly, we've seen some efforts, excuse me, from crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in trying to diversify the Saudi economy. And I think these efforts are commendable and should certainly be encouraged by the United States to try to move away from its oil-dependent economy, and also to hopefully move away from this inordinate expenditure on military.

However, I think as long as the States remain autocratic, we are likely to see them continue to invest in their security apparatuses, partly as a means of protecting themselves from their own populations. So again, some of this just goes back to the fact that the regional dynamics are sort of artificially stable as a result of autocracy and the American military in Germany.

But an additional point I would make here is that, although to this point several from the second Bush administration to the Obama administration through to a certain extent, the Trump administration, and now under the Biden administration, we have seen U.S. foreign policy establishment emphasize the need to get out of the Middle East, to end the endless wars there and to focus more on Asia and on this perceived threat from China. And yet, our security partners in the region are averse to that. They want to see the United States maintain a large military presence on the ground and to continue to support them. And so essentially, the United States, this will happen eventually.

It's been a long slow process but I do think, I mean, somewhat, unfortunately, as we see the U.S. embracing more and more of this language of a so-called cold war with China, which I think is very problematic for its own reasons in terms of emphasizing the need for more military buildup, the need to combat China as opposed to the fact that we're all working from, or almost all of us are working from home offices as results of global pandemic that the world has been unable to effectively combat up to this point a year in. That clearly, as well as global problems like climate change, the undue expenditure of a nation's resources on its military, which is something that the United States is particularly guilty of as well.

This is simply not going to be sustainable as we move towards a world of global problems where a nation's individual military capacities is going to be useless in the face of these global problems. So just to go back to the... I've zoomed way out. So, to get back to the narrow question of the implications of nuclear agreement for regional stability, I feel that it would be good for regional stability that these countries would not then feel that they necessarily have to scramble to acquire nuclear weapons in order to counterbalance a perceived threat from Iran. I do recognize that there are arguments that these countries will sort of continue to feel that Iran is a threat. And I think that the best way of combating that is for U.S. to have a much smaller presence in the region so that these countries will have to base their own level of aggressiveness on their own military capacity and their appetite for

Dr. Raz Zimmt: Thank you, Annelle. Let's have another try with Sebastian. Can you hear me?

Dr. Sebastian Sons: Yes. I can hear you. Again, sorry.

Dr. Raz Zimmt: That's fine. So just your take on the first question because we missed most of what you tried to say.

Dr. Sebastian Sons: Okay. Now I'll try to make it very brief because I don't know what you have heard and what you don't have heard. So, with regards to Saudi Arabia, I think regional stability is one of its key priorities. So, if the nuclear agreement could serve regional stability, then of course it's in the interest of Saudi Arabia. But of course there are some preconditions as I've outlined before. The nuclear deal needs to address the regional ambitions and the influence of Iran, its ballistic missile program, the control or the influence on the Houthis, et cetera.

And if this is not about to happen, then of course, Saudi Arabia has to adapt to the situation, which is at the moment very risky and therefore Saudi Arabia is following a more pragmatic approach. It's trying to make concessions towards the Biden administration on the domestic, on the international level as we've seen with the Al-Ula declaration, as we have seen also with the release of some human rights activists in the last couple of weeks. As we have also seen with regards to some reforms in the Catholicism system just announced today. And of course this is one approach in order to reconcile again with Biden, but it is also the approval or it's the attempt to present itself as a reliable, as a pragmatic, and also as a constructive partner in the region.

And this image was of course, or is very much shattered due to the Khashoggi affair, due to the engagement in Yemen, et cetera. So, in this regard, Saudi Arabia needs to do some extent, a turnaround and regional stability is one aspect the Saudi leadership really needs in order to realize and follow it's domestic socio-economic transformation. So, without regional stability, there is no chance that vision 2030 can be successful. And this is of course also one element we need to take into consideration. And for the Saudi leadership, specifically for Mohammad bin Salman, the domestic audience is top priority. So, the young people within the kingdom that are at the moment suffering from high youth unemployment, that are suffering from insecurity, that are suffering also from the ramifications of COVID-19, are specifically topics that need to be addressed. And without regional stability, such problems cannot be overcome and vision 2030 cannot be achieved. And this could at the end also accelerate social frustration.

It could also undermine the still existing image of Mohammad bin Salman within its country as a reformer, as a modernizer, as someone who can make a difference when it comes to promoting the youth and engaging the youth. So, therefore, and I think that is what also is discussed inside Saudi Arabia. Therefore, let's say they need to reduce their anti-Iranian rhetoric, they need to try finding a different way how to approach the common enemy Iran in the future. Specifically, when it comes to Yemen, there's a need at least to have a kind of a face-saving solution to engage directly or indirectly with Iran. And I think those considerations are at the moment discussed in Saudi Arabia. And therefore I would say that there is a kind of wind of change when it comes to the regional behavior of Saudi Arabia. We have to wait and see if this is long-lasting if this is not only tactical and this holds true in the foreseeable future.

Dr. Raz Zimmt: Thank you, Sebastian. And I would like to move to another issue, which is the possibility of forming the so-called Arab NATO following the possibility of pertaining to the JCPOA. Kristian, what is your take on this possibility?

Dr. Kristian Ulrichsen: Well, first of all, the Middle East strategic alliance was never considered to be an Arab NATO. Where that kind of misnomer developed was to be in Emiratis especially. To some extent the Saudis but mainly the UAE were trying to spin it as such to try and portray it as something more than it actually was. And to try and imply that there was a collective security underpinning framework like with NATO article five and that was never envisaged. Partly because the Trump administration at least had the awareness to acknowledge that there was no consensus among the six GCC States on some of these major regional issues. And so there would never have been a sort of agreement to move to a more collective security framework. That being said, the middle East strategic alliance was put together to try and formalize some of the interoperability issues that successive U.S. administrations from George W. Bush onwards had always been trying to push those Gulf partners to do.

I think there was frustration that every gulf partner was doing its own thing in terms of security and defense. Making its own arrangements, buying systems that weren't compatible with each other often competing with each other in a sort of regional buildup and arms races Annellata has indicated. And so there was a push to at least try and formalize some of the interoperability by creating this Mesa framework. But that doesn't seem to have the transition from jump to Biden. To be honest, I think it was already dead at least at the end of 2019, early 2020, before the pandemic hit. There were meetings in Washington, there were meetings of regional leaders or at least security and defense leaders. But again, that lack of consensus from the beginning, I think, meant that they could only go so far. So, I now see that Arab NATO is likely, I think with the Biden administration, they will try to continue to push the Gulf States to speak with more one voice.

But I still think that at least among the GCC States themselves without the U.S. being as heavily engaged in trying to push and kind of Mesa framework as the Trump administration was, they probably won't do it on themselves. I mean, they do already have the GCC as the sort of regional framework. And to be quite honest, for 40 years, they've been unable to agree on big ticket issues especially on regional and foreign policy such as Iran. Partly because they don't even share a common perception as to what kind of threats Iran actually poses. And so for those reasons alone, I don't necessarily see there will be a push to form an Arab NATO among the Gulf States. So, I would just add also that in 2015, the initial response of the Saudis and Emiratis to the negotiations for the JCPOA was to go into Yemen.

The intervention in Yemen began in March, 2015, the same week that P5+1 negotiators were in Switzerland trying to finalize the JCPOA. They initially had a deadline of March 31st, 2015, five days after the Yemen war began. That deadline was then pushed back to the middle of July, 2015, just to give a bit more time to finalize the agreement. So, in 2015, we saw a very clear statement from the Saudis and the Emiratis that we're effectively telling the U.S. administration, the Obama administration that we don't feel you can divorce the nuclear agreement from Iran wide regional kind of ambitions as we see it from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. I don't necessarily think that will happen this time around just because 2021 is not 2015. 2021 is six years into the war in Yemen where the Saudis and the UAE initially went in thinking they would have a quick and decisive military intervention.

They are now bogged down. They've realized the limitations of their power as Melvin said, in previous interventions. The 2019 attacks on archaic and alpinists in Saudi Arabia, shocked the UAE and Saudi Arabia into kind of realizing that the U.S. wouldn't always be there to protect them, come what may. And so when Qasem Soleimani was assassinated in January 2020, the initial response from Abu Dhabi and Riyadh was to try and de-escalate because they felt they were on their own more than they had thought maybe in 2015. So, for that reason alone, I think the response, should there be any new agreements with Iran? I think the response from Abu Dhabi and Riyadh will likely be quite different from that of 2015 when their response was to say, okay, fine, you make your agreement, we'll do it. We'll go low in Yemen. I will always dare you to support us. You cannot side with Iran with the agreement or side with us in supporting our military adventure into Yemen. Now that happened, and that has been a disaster. So, for that reason alone, I think the response would be quite different this time.

Dr. Raz Zimmt: Thank you. That was interesting. Sebastian, could I take the same question back to you considering the Arab NATO? But perhaps you could also address the issue, not just the possibility of the so-called Arab NATO, but also a potential greater cooperation between the Gulf States and Israel, especially for the Abraham Accords in case of a return to the JCPOA.

Dr. Sebastian Sons: Yeah, sure. And I think that this is one relevant topic that needs to be discussed, that needs to be taken into consideration. And for sure as Kristian said, I also agree that there might be a different approach, a different reaction to a new JCPOA because Saudi Arabia more than the UAE has learned its lesson hopefully when it comes to military interventions such as in Yemen. Because it is disastrous and they need to get out of Yemen and there was a huge miscalculation from the Saudi perspective to have a quick win there in 2015. With regards the regional cooperation, and I don't want to call it Arab NATO because I also don't think that this will happen, I think we have to take two perspectives into consideration. The first one is we have regional players such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel that have of course, a common understanding about Iran.

That Iran is to some extent an existential threat and needs to be counterbalanced, at least on the one hand and these demands will be addressed also to the Biden administration. And if this concern is not accepted or is not taken seriously, then of course they need to align with each other much more. So, we have seen the Abraham Accords. We have seen that UAE and Israel are closely cooperating on different fields. And it's for sure that this is also an alliance against Iran and to close range within the reason. Saudi Arabia has to play a slightly different role here, so there is of course no normalization with Israel. I would say in the short-term, in the midterm, that is not at site, at least under the current King Salman. But not only now but even years before, there has been an ongoing security cooperation and exchange with Israel.

I would also imagine that this is likely to intensify in order to address the threat of Iran much further. And also to from a Saudi perspective to diversify its security partnerships. So, as Kristian said, the attack on the oil facilities in 2019 was an eye opener. It was sure for Saudi Arabia that the U.S. is not on their side at all costs. So therefore, Israel is a neutral partner when it comes to military and security cooperation. We also see other approaches with Russia, with China, there have been joint exercise with Greece, for instance. So military diversification is part of the Saudi strategy at the moment. And there is of course also the tendency to localize the military industry and to be a little bit more independent from the U.S. industry guard, but...

And from the U S in this regard. But the GCC is not a monolithic block and where we have a friend UAE and Saudi on the one hand, there is of course, with Qatar, with Oman, with Kuwait actors that's traditionally, so show a much more pragmatic approach towards Iran. And there are more interested to have them to follow a balancing act between one camp and the other. So therefore, although there was the Al-Ula agreement officially they have solved the issues, but the remaining obstacles, they are still there and they have not been tackled. And this is also true when it comes to how to deal with Iran in general.

So therefore, a lot more needs to be done in order to build trust within the GCC, not only with regards to Iran, but also with regards to the Muslim brotherhood, to political Islam, to other obstacles that has led to the Gulf rift four years ago. So, and therefore, I think at the moment, it's for Saudi Arabia and UAE, maybe much more likely to moralize on the security level with Israel, then to find a common ground on how to deal with Iran with the conferences,

Dr. Raz Zimmt: Thank you, Sebastian. And now what is your take, do you think there is a sense of perhaps concern in DC over the possibility of perhaps greater cooperation between the Gulf States and Israel against Iran in case of US return to the Nuclear Deal?

Dr. Annelle Sheline: I think we probably will see that. And we had, I don't know if it's been confirmed, but at the end of February, there was an announcement of a possible defense Alliance that was being discussed between Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, which I think goes back to, to Kristian's point, and Sebastian's point about the fact that the Gulf as such is not a monolithic block, that you do tend to see Saudi Arabia and the UAE often working in partnership with each other and sort of bringing Bahrain along, whereas Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar tend to be more open to interaction, or at least less aggressive towards Iran. And interestingly, we also, although it doesn't get talked about as much, tend to see a somewhat more conciliatory attitude towards Iran from Dubai, not as much from Abu Dhabi necessarily, but in general, Dubai is interested in business partnership there, they know that wars and conflict are really not in the interest of a vibrant sort of business climate that they have worked hard to cultivate.

And so moving forward, I do think it will be interesting to not only look at the diversity of opinions, sort of between the different Gulf States, but also within the leadership of the UAE, where obviously we have Mohammed bin Zayed, the Crown Prince, and de facto leader is, at the moment, leading much of Emirate policy, but we might increasingly see more resistance, especially from the leaders of Dubai who stand to lose as a result of the greater conflict that could further hurt Dubai's economy, which has been quite damaged by COVID. So again, just moving forward, I also want to push back against the notion that's been called Arab NATO, because that does imply as Kristian said, sort of a mutual defense agreement that the us would be obligated to intervene militarily, to defend these Arab partners. I do think we may see, as I said, some kind of defense arrangement with Israel and the three sort of more anti-Iran Gulf countries.

And your question was about whether in DC there's concern about that. I mean I do think there's concern about the possibility of escalation and in particular, this goes back to my point about how the US and these countries should be primarily interested in Iran not attaining a nuclear weapon. So, then there would be less concern about a nuclear arms race in the region, which could quickly get out of hand. And, but also just to reiterate my point, that when these sort of US security partners feel that the US is going to back them up, then they have fewer compunctions about engaging in this more aggressive stance towards Iran. Whereas, if the US were less involved, then there really is a question of do we want to fight this war ourselves with our own resources and our own citizenry?

And so, for that reason, I think even if we did see greater security partnership among those four States, again, Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain, that as long as the US wasn't sorted of backing them up and or sort of giving them the impression that it would back them up militarily if they were to go after Iran. I do think that we would not necessarily see them behaving so aggressively. I do think that these countries are not interested in fighting a war.

Annelle: As was mentioned by Sebastian, the Saudis hopefully have learned their lesson in terms of the reality of the costs of the war in Yemen, not only for sort of Saudi coffers but just in terms of their own security. Now they went into the war thinking that this would or my understanding is, Mohammed bin Salman went in thinking it would be easy, and now six years later is dealing with a much greater security threat and also a much greater presence of Iran in Yemen, which was originally the concern or the sensible concern motivating that intervention. So clearly, I hope that the takeaway has been that military intervention can often lead to sort of much worse outcomes.

And one final point just to make here. I think partly just thinking about Saudi aggression in the past several years occurred in the context of this sort of unquestioned support from the Trump administration for the Saudis. We clearly saw sort of buddy-buddy relations, Saudi Arabia and Israel being the first two countries that Trump visited. And following that, we saw the blockade of Qatar. Kristian has written a whole book on this and is much more of an expert if we want to get into that.

But just in general, my hope is that Mohammed bin Salman, as Sebastian mentioned, has articulated this very ambitious program for Saudi Arabia. And I do hope that now he no longer feels that he has sort of the American military juggernaut backing him up, that perhaps he has learned that moving forward, he has staked his entire reputation on providing better economic outcomes for the young Saudi population. And if he fails at that, he has assumed full responsibility here. So, I do hope that moving forward, we may at least have Mohammed bin Salman adopting perhaps a somewhat more circumspect approach to at least military engagement.

Dr. Raz Zimmt: Thank you, Annelle. Well, I think we, I see we are running out of time, but please allow me last short round of addressing the one short answer, one short question, and that's perhaps the most sensitive issue of whether the new circumstances might push Saudi Arabia, especially Saudi Arabia to develop its own nuclear weapon, but please allow yourself to use this last round of question if you want to address other issues as well. Before we move to the questions from the audience. So, Kristian, could you, could you stop this?

Dr. Kristian Ulrichsen: Yeah, I think it would be foolhardy extreme for the Saudi leadership to try to develop a nuclear weapons program given its positioning, especially in the US under the current administration and for the next four years. I think that would encounter, a difficult opposition from all sides in the US undermining the Saudis. I think a regional standing to some extent it would certainly not be something I would recommend a Saudi leadership would do. And I think the Saudis have in the past made it quite clear, but they've at least given indications that if they need what they feel the need to develop a nuclear weapon, they have arrangements with other States in the past Pakistan and the A.Q. Khan network has been often mentioned. That said, we are seeing a greater push to localize defense industry production in Saudi Arabia, as we've had in the UAE as increasingly what's happening in Qatar and also in Qatar relationship with Turkey as well.

So, we are seeing much more emphasis on localization, but I think we will see a defense arms industry emerging in the Gulf to a greater extent than we have in the past. I would call Muhammad bin Salman saying in 2018, as if Iran went to a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would do the same. And I think that's that position. And I think until there's incontrovertible evidence, that Iran is trying to develop a nuclear weapons program. I think the Saudis will try and just hedge their bets and to try to at least keep open the option of procuring something somewhere down the line. I just think that the, let's call it the risk of the Saudis doing themselves would be too great. At least while account's administration is in office.

Dr. Raz Zimmt: Thank you, Kristian. Sebastian? Could you take this one?

Dr. Sebastian Sons: Yeah. Thank you. Yes. I agree with Kristian that in the next couple of years, Saudi Arabia would really like to follow up on nuclear weapons. It would be a catastrophe for their international standing, not only in the US but also with regards to Europe. And I think that Mohammed bin Salman is taking this into consideration. Although he has mentioned that if Iran would have nuclear bet on Saudi Arabia follow leads, I think that has more to do with domestic, with a nationalistic approach in order to also show and to present himself at that time as a strong leader, as someone who is not willing to accept that there is a regional actor that is challenging national security of Saudi Arabia, et cetera. And also to show that Mohammad bin Salman is more capable and more assertive than, for instance, a former King, such as, King Abdullah. So, in this regard, I think it's part of the rhetoric of Saudi Arabia.

They will continue localizing their military businesses, but when it comes to nuclear capacities, I'm not really sure if Pakistan can in the future, will in the future, really play the role as a nuclear umbrella or nuclear protector. Which is also based on some bilateral tensions that has increased in recent months between Saudi Arabia and and Pakistan for several reasons. So therefore, Pakistan has a much more contested and that could also play out. And that could also be included into the assessment of Saudi Arabia, with whom they can really work with. So, at the moment, when it comes to security... He provide us, beside the UAE or partners in the Gulf it's Israel. And that's even more likely that protection for Pakistan.

Dr. Raz Zimmt: Thank you, Sebastian. Annelle, last but not least.

Dr. Annelle Sheline: So, the way the question was phrased, at least that when I received it was how will nuclear talks with Iran impact the Gulf States defense strategies? Will such talks push Saudi Arabia to develop its own nuclear weapon? Which to me seems a little bit odd that if Iran rejoins the nuclear deal and reduces its nuclear capacity, why that would push Saudi Arabia to develop a nuclear weapon?

I think the concern at the moment is that the US fails to rejoin the JCPOA or fails to renegotiate a nuclear agreement with Iran and Iran acquires nuclear technology. At which point, although I do think there would potentially be reputational costs, but I think there would be a certain amount of international understanding that Saudi Arabia for example, would then feel that it needed to acquire nuclear capacity. So in general, I do, although I had made the point earlier that actors like Saudi Arabia have demonstrated that they're more interested in keeping Iran isolated than necessarily preventing it from gaining access to a nuclear weapon.

And so again, I think in general, it is very much in the interest of the whole region to prevent further nuclearization. That being said, I do think one possible way that the Biden administration could perhaps consider approaching this would be to support the development of nuclear power, especially for the purpose of water desalinization.

The region, in general, is already experiencing heightened temperature increases due to climate change and moving forward, there are concerns that large parts of the region will no longer be habitable. And so while the region is admirably investing in renewable resources, given their vast access to sort of the possibility of solar energy, as well as wind energy. The current trajectory of another energy usage would perhaps be, they wouldn't have to be incentivized to have access to sort of non-military nuclear energy capacity. And that this could potentially be something that the US could offer to Saudi Arabia as sort of perhaps an incentive to dissuade them from trying to acquire a nuclear weapon, but to still address their general energy needs. But again, just in general, I think it's in the entire region's interest to not get into a nuclear arms race.

Dr. Raz Zimmt: Well, thank you, Annelle. Thank you very much my colleagues here, and I think now this is a good time to go back to Becky, to moderate the questions from the audience.

Dr. Becky Molloy: All right. So we have some interesting kind of pinpointed questions. And I'll start with you one question, and I apologize for my pronunciation of your name Juan. He asks about currency markets' evolution, and their lack of regulation has played a role in the capacity of Iran to trade. And in which measure do you think that has affected the implementation of sanctions and security surveillance? So I guess it's mostly regarding the cryptocurrency market's evolution.

Dr. Raz Zimmt: Well, I'm afraid I'm not an expert on crypto issues or cryptocurrency, and yes, there have been many reports about this cryptocurrency, which makes it easier for Iran to gain some advantages. But I have to say that with all due respect to this issue, I think that the best way Iran has been dealing with the sanctions is not through this kind of cryptocurrency, but more by trying to diversify its economy.

Both when it comes to choosing partners who are less vulnerable to US sanctions... It used to be until a few months ago. So I think yes, the cryptocurrency is perhaps part of this solution, but there are other ways if Iran, to have this kind of resilience, the economy to deal with the sanctions.

Dr. Becky Molloy: Do any of our other distinguished panelists want to answer this?

Dr. Annelle Sheline: I'm also not an expert on cryptocurrency, so I won't be able to speak as much to that, but I do think the question does get to an important issue, which is the in my view, the over-reliance on the United States on sanctions. I think in the context of sort of general American frustration with a lot of military interventions, especially after 9/11, Americans are pretty sick of sending, spending blood and treasure on sending our military abroad. And as a result, even sort of less hawkish members of the foreign policy establishment have turned to sanctions as sort of this alternative way of trying to impose US objectives on the rest of the world. And as a result, we do see, especially in countries like Iran, but as well as China and Russia and other countries, Venezuela, trying to find ways around American sanctions.

And this is understandable from their perspective that the US is imposing them, and they are suffering as a result. I mean, we know that sanctions, in general, hurt the population more than they hurt the rulers and do tend to in fact, reinforce support for even autocratic and unpopular rulers. And so in general, I think the United States needs to be very cautious about the scope of reliance on sanctions because it is undermining the world's reliance on the US dollar as the world's reserve currency. And so again, this doesn't necessarily get to the question of cryptocurrency, but it does get to the ways that the US continues to try to sort of imposing its agenda on the world and how that can sort of backfire in unintended ways.

Dr. Becky Molloy: Sure. Yeah. Well, sanctions without diplomacy end up, isn't going to necessarily be able to do what we want, but thank you. Does anybody else want to comment on that? Any of the other panelists? Otherwise, there's another question regarding when the US signs another modified or goes back to the JCPOA or Iran, or when the US sorry, signed the JCPOA, Iran started shelling Pakistani areas on the border on a daily basis, what would be the impact of a nuclear deal revival on Pakistan?

Dr. Raz Zimmt: Yeah, I think we should not, we should try not to put everything on the JCPOA. I mean, as Israeli people usually ask me, do you think that the US return to the JCPOA, this will mean that Iran will increase its entrenchment in Syria. And I have to remind everyone that Iran’s support and deployment of Radical militias in Iraq and Syria started way before the JCPOA. So yes, you might perhaps say that they might have moved more money to invest in the regional policy. But I think that the money was never the problem.

So, I think that when it comes to the relations between Iran and Pakistan and all those exchange findings the border in the system, by which you stand, I'm not sure it has anything to do with the JCPOA. It has to do with other issues concerning the problem with the promise of drugs and the problems of all those groups, Baluchi groups acting there. I don't really think that the JCPOA will have any impact on this issue.

Dr. Becky Molloy: So Sudip Sharma asks with oil prices being low, Gulf countries are taking a hit for quite some time. If I were Saudi Arabia, UAE, et cetera, I would like to stir up tensions to keep oil prices higher. Do you agree? So, I would go with our GCC wanks maybe Kristian, would you like to start?

Dr. Kristian Ulrichsen: Well, I mean, oil prices are much higher today than they were a year ago. It wasn't much higher today than I think most experts had predicted they would be at this stage when we were still in the middle of the pandemic and in the midst of lockdowns across most of the world. So, I think from a Saudi perspective, they would like to see oil prices at between $70 and $75 a barrel. I think they consider that a sweet spot between the needs of consumers and producing nations. And to be quite honest, they're almost there right now. I guess, the issue of lamenting or deliberately stoking instability to drive prices up, it might do so in the short term, but the longer-term price dynamic is something they can't necessarily control. So, make it a short-term balance.

I think we saw at the most recent OPEC Plus meeting, the decision to restrain production for at least another few months and attempt to try and manage oil or the markets to produce a sweet spot. And I think to be honest, that's what the Saudi leadership in partnership with Russia, although there are some tensions of trying to achieve at least in the next few months until perhaps we know more about whether or not they will be any form of agreement with Iran or whether there will be some sort of escalation and regional attention, which might then create a seven-part spike for the down line.

Dr. Becky Molloy: Sebastian, would you like to add anything to that, or I don't know if you can hear me. Think he froze again. Okay. There is a question for Sebastian, but I don't know if he can hear me. Let's see if I can get to him. No. All right. We'll save that one. Let's see if there's another one. Yep. There was that. Okay. Is Dr. Sonnes back? I think he is. Sebastian, can you hear me?

Dr. Sebastian Sons: Yes, I can hear you. I was kicked out again, sorry.

Dr. Becky Molloy: No worries. So, we have a question specifically for you from a Fatima. We have seen closer Omani Saudi talks in recent weeks, and the US seems to favor such a regional combo to approach the war in Yemen. Do you see the two countries can also work together on the Iranian matter?

Dr. Sebastian Sons: Yeah, so I think, of course, for Saudi Arabia, it's quite relevant to engage with Oman on Yemen, both have a security interest in Yemen that the situation will improve quite soon. I don't really know if Oman is really capable in making a difference with regards to the Houthis. So, at least from my understanding, there are some contacts and there have been talks. Maybe there are also some better-established contacts between Oman and the Houthis than between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, but, in general, I think there is much more than Saudi Arabia needs to do.

And, at the moment, it seems that the Houthis are not really willing to engage and to negotiate because they see themselves in a very strong military position. And in this regard, what I heard from Yemen, also from my Saudi colleagues, of course, they are frustrated and it's very difficult at the moment to achieve compromise or at least agree on a ceasefire with the Saudis, with the Houthis, because also the Houthis are not a monolithic block. They are separate factions and some of them are maybe a little bit more in favor of finding a compromise and having negotiations, real negotiations, and the others are more in favor of a military solution. So, in this regard, for Saudi Arabia, it's important to talk with Oman. It's also important to continue talking and engaging with the UAE in order to have at least leverage on the Houthis. But yeah, it's really, really difficult and how I see it at the moment is that Saudi Arabia is not anymore...very much interested in a comprehensive solution in Yemen. It's more interested about defending its own borders...

I was just saying that Saudi Arabia is focusing and prioritizing more defending its borders than finding a comprehensive solution inside Yemen, because at the moment they are struggling on a daily basis with such attacks coming from the Houthis, and that is their top priority. And of course, they are lacking leverage. They are, therefore, as we discussed before, indirectly or directly approaching Iran in order to better control the Houthis stopping launching attacks on Saudi soil, or at least also agree on a ceasefire, could be one part of the Saudi consideration.

Dr. Annelle Sheline: Just super quickly, I think the... I definitely agree with Sebastian's point that the situation in Yemen is obviously hugely difficult. One thing to consider, I do think the Omanis do have a closer relationship with the Houthis, certainly, than the Saudis do, but also in one of the earlier wars fought between the Houthis and the Yemeni government in the early 2000s, Qatar was influential in achieving one of the ceasefires. And so, although that's situations have changed and it's unclear, necessarily, to what extent Qatar would be willing or able to do that again, I do think that perhaps it would be useful to think about their possible influence. Although, again, I think that may have been spoiled somewhat because the Saudis were unwilling to have Qatar sort of develop a larger role partnering with the Houthis.

But to get just back to the question of whether Oman could play a role with Iran, this is what happened. And leading to the JCPOA, it was the role of Oman that helped to sort of foster the back-channel negotiations that eventually resulted in the Iran deal. However, that was partly predicated on the relatively close relationship between Secretary of State John Kerry and Sultan Qaboos, who passed away last year. And so it's not yet clear, necessarily, that Sultan Haitham has the same sort of relationship with key individuals, whether in the Biden administration or elsewhere in the region, that Oman could necessarily play that role again. But it could be possible.

Dr. Becky Molloy: I agree. So, this... Maybe this would be the last question. It kind of gives a different perspective. The question has to do with... So, to the American side, how can Biden anchor the nuclear deal if the US and Iran do a return or do its modified JCPOA, to anchor the deal better, politically, in Washington to avoid future administration walking away again? So, yes, from an American perspective that would have to do with the workings of Congress, et cetera, but maybe our panelists can give their take from the Gulf, the Iran, et cetera, perspective. How could we anchor this better so the US can't just walk away again?

Dr. Raz Zimmt: Well, I think that Annelle could understand the domestic politics in the US better than me, but what I can say is that this is certainly a big concern for Iran. And when you hear Khomeini saying that perhaps we should neutralize the sanction rather than remove the sanctions, that is part of the... This is what I referred to earlier as the "wall of mistrust." And he really doesn't believe that he can build his economy on the perception that in the future the US will not do the same.

And I have to say that it's not just a matter of, "Well, what will happen if a Republican is elected as president?" But when you hear Biden administration saying again and again that even if we remove the sanctions, if Iran is not going to be ready to go back to negotiations over a longer and a better JCPOA, in a matter of a year or two years, we will reimpose sanctions that gives the Iranians the sense that, "Why should we go back to the JCPOA? Why we should bother to have a sanction relief if no one can guarantee that this situation won't continue forever?"

Dr. Becky Molloy: Annelle, would you like to take a stab at it?

Dr. Annelle Sheline: Sure. Yeah, just quickly. I know we're almost out of time. I think this is, as Raz mentioned, this is clearly a concern for Iran. And I think also perhaps a concern on the American side, knowing that the JCPOA was ultimately simply dependent on the Obama administration, so that moving forward, for it to be more durable, it would need to come from Congress and to be an act of legislation that would be more difficult to overturn than simply a new administration coming to power.

And I think, in general, part of the issue with the Iran deal was it did not address the fundamental US role in the region, within which countries like Saudi Arabia, Israel, the UAE, their circumstances were unchanged. And so from their perspective, they still had the full backing and support of the United States and they weren't necessarily that interested in sort of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, because felt they could still rely entirely on, or substantially, on the fact that the US continued to maintain a large military presence and continued to sell inordinate amounts of weapons.

And so, moving forward, I think to actually shift the status quo in the region, it would require the United States to have a smaller footprint so that these countries would feel that it is, in fact, in their own best interests to not get into a situation of escalating tension or outright war with Iran. And, again, that will only be possible if they don't feel they can simply fall back on the United States to protect them.

Adam Hoffman, Head of Middle East Desk: Could I actually ask a question in response to what Annelle just said? How is this different, at least in principle, from President Obama's doctrine of “leading from behind”, which was then considered to be a readjustment of the US role in the Middle East, what you just proposed right now?

Dr. Annelle Sheline: I mean, I think, unfortunately, we saw leading from behind didn't necessarily lead to good outcomes either. For example, that was used in the US role in Libya, where, again, we've seen pretty awful outcomes. And so, in general, I think the United States, moving forward... I mean, partly as an American, we all need to develop a clear-eyed understanding that the world is multipolar at this point.

The United States is no longer, moving forward, going to be sort of the unipolar actor who can impose its will on the world and we are going to have to get more accustomed to a sort of cooperation and partnership, and diplomacy. And so, again, just I think this notion of kind of leading from behind was still coming from an attitude of a preference for, and an assumption of, American supremacy. And, moving forward, if the United States continues to maintain this, it will simply continue to sort of fritter away resources while American quality of life and American diplomacy, or American democracy, truly suffers here at home.

Adam Hoffman, Head of Middle East Desk: So, you're talking about something which is, in a sense, “leading from behind” but from a position of the US being more of equal power, not a hegemon, in the Middle East already, if I understand you correctly?

Dr. Annelle Sheline: Yes, and not so much American leadership. That, moving forward, the United States has much more limited interests in the Middle East, both as a result of no longer being dependent on petroleum, but also just acknowledging that Israel, for example, now has much closer relationships with several Arab states and so no longer needs this sort of overwhelming US military support. So, moving forward, the US simply does not have as much of an interest in being involved in the Middle East in general, as a leader or a security guarantor.

Adam Hoffman, Head of Middle East Desk: Thank you.

Dr. Kristian Ulrichsen: Can I just finally add about the question about what could the US do to try to strengthen the agreement or to anchor the agreement? Because obviously there's a lack of trust. Why would Iran or anyone else trust that a future president, who might share a lack of appreciation of the deal, not if they withdraw? And that goes to the heart of the problem, that the JCPOA was not a Senate-ratified treaty, but to do that, you would need 67 votes in the Senate which, just politically-speaking, is impossible.

It was impossible for Obama. It was impossible for... It will be impossible for Biden, because what we saw was that the JCPOA was classed as a nonbinding political commitment, which is very different and much easier for Trump to simply withdraw from. We saw that also at the Paris Climate Change Accord. That was an executive agreement.

And again, not having the protection, the political protection of a treaty, made it very easy for a successor administration to withdraw. Unlike, for example, in 1992, when the George H. W. Bush administration actually got the Senate to ratify the real climate change agreement of 1992. That actually had protection. So that's what they could do to try and anchor and give political protection to the agreement, but I think we all know that, politically, it's almost impossible to imagine any form of bipartisan support sufficient to get 67 votes in support of the agreement. So, I think, politically, it's almost impossible.

Dr. Becky Molloy: Okay. I think, unless Sebastian, you'd like to add something, maybe from the KSA perspective or any of the other GCC countries?

Dr. Sebastian Sons: Yeah, thank you. No, I just wanted to add something from the European perspective, because at the moment, for our discussion, we did not really tackle Europe. And this is, of course, a very relevant player when it comes to reviving the JCPOA, when it comes also to confidence-building methods in the region. So, of course, we know that Europe is not united.

The European Union has its own problems. France and Germany, they have sometimes also contradicting positions when it comes to the Gulf, when it comes to the whole region. There are sometimes also lack of strategy in some of the member states of the European Union but, in principle, I think today is the momentum, maybe also an historic momentum, for Europe to engage more and to force exactly the values and the ideas Europe stands for, which is, of course, regional integration, which is a common understanding, and nowadays take into consideration that the US is fostering a retrenchment from the region.

There is a need also for Europe and when you talk to specific interlocutors in the Arab Gulf states, they are, to some extent, disappointed by Europe, that there was not a stronger engagement in the past, but they also still hope that that could be intensified in the future. And I think that is also on our side, on the European side, to show now that we can also have an added value in order to fostering regional integration and at least exchange. And this role can be played by the European Union as an institution. It can also be played by specific member states and I want just to raise also that Europe is not completely irrelevant when it comes to the region, and of course not when it comes to the JCPOA.

Dr. Becky Molloy: I did want to ask one question, directed at Raz, just because we're kind of pussyfooting around what I'm taking as the main drawbacks of the JCPOA, if we're going to go back to them. So, if Raz could explain? I believe you wrote, or co-wrote, an article in December about the delusion, the delusion of the all-encompassing, or multi-track record, accord. And so what did you mean by that? If we understand that, how could that contribute to efforts to going back to a version of a JCPOA?

Dr. Raz Zimmt: Well, I think you relate to something I wrote about the possibility of addressing the regional issue as part of the JCPOA. And my view has been always, and I think that that's a theme that's been the Israeli traditional position, that the nuclear issue is too important, especially for Israel, to let other issues... to be taken hostage by other issues. And I think that, as I said before, there are things which should be done to try and deal with Iranian regional activity and influence. I think that we have to realize that Iran is here to stay rather... Iran is certainly a regional power and one has to take into consideration its interest as well.

But I think that even if we want to address Iran's regional policy, especially when it comes to Israeli concerns, mainly in Syria, in Lebanon, in Gaza, then it should not be addressed through the JCPOA. The Israeli traditional position has always been the international community should address the nuclear issue because that's too big for Israel to address by its own. When it comes to the missiles and to the regional issue, there are other ways to deal with Iran, not just through the JCPOA.

And when it comes to the JCPOA, I think that it won't be easy to go back there. Again, I still don't believe that if Biden is ready to remove sanctions, Iran will say, "We'll refuse to do that." I think the main issue when it comes to Iran is the removal of the sanctions. But I think that as time passes and as there is a sense in Iran that there is actually no difference between Trump and Biden when it comes to the maximum pressure policy, and as we are facing, in less than three months, the presidential elections, and yes, Khomeini is the Supreme Leader, and it makes the decision the president will have to abide, but I think it will be very different to have negotiations between the US and Iran with someone like Zarif, rather than someone like Saeed Jalili or Raisi as president. I'm afraid it's going to be much more complicated to reach an understanding with a president like Raisi or even Bagher Ghalibaf or even Larijani.

Adam Hoffman, Head of Middle East Desk: Thank you very much, Becky, for moderating the Q and A. We are already out of time, but I would like to ask Annelle, Kristian and Sebastian, if you have any kind of final comments to wrap up this fascinating discussion? So if there's anything you'd like to say, which is maybe a bit of a change compared to where we started this discussion over an hour ago, if there's anything you think should be added from the US, Iranian, Saudi or Emirati or another Gulf-y context, which you think compliments the picture that we just had here during this discussion? Annelle, Kristian, Sebastian, would you like to respond to that? Annelle, can we start with you, if you have anything to add?

Dr. Annelle Sheline: Nothing to add. I actually do have to hop off now.

Adam Hoffman, Head of Middle East Desk: Yeah, it's a bit over time, so I completely understand. Thank you so much for your participation.

Dr. Annelle Sheline: Thank you.

Adam Hoffman, Head of Middle East Desk: Kristian, do you want to add anything here?

Dr. Kristian Ulrichsen: Just briefly to say that I think, as has come out in this discussion, the lack of trust on all sides, the fact that domestic politics on all sides will play into everything, that there's no easy interlocutor one-on-one, that the US has domestic politics, Iran has domestic politics, and also the regional dimension as well, will all kind of intersect. And, to be honest, if you ask me, I think it's almost impossible to imagine that any new form of a JCPOA can be reached, just because the positions are so diametrically opposed. Iran does not want a new agreement. The Biden administration says it wants an expanded and strengthened one and right now, at least, I just don't see any willingness or capacity to bridge that gap, not least because both parties have that domestic constituency to try and kind of bear with. So, yeah, that's my summing-up.

Adam Hoffman, Head of Middle East Desk: And so if I may be rephrase to what you just said, it's not all about the US. There might be a great difference between Trump and Biden when it comes to the US and Iran, but it's not only what the US does or doesn't do which will affect the feasibility of JCPOA 2.0.

Dr. Kristian Ulrichsen:And to be honest I've been surprised that the Biden administration hasn't actually done more to re-enter it, if only just because all the key figures who were instrumental in the negotiation of JCPOA are now back in government and actually higher positions. And so, I mean, that's people like Jake Sullivan, who is now national security advisor, Anthony Blinken, who is now secretary of state and also Bill Burns, who was instrumental in the... Together with Jake Sullivan, they were the two who actually were negotiating in Oman in 2012, 2013, and he's now incoming as CIA director. So, you have the same people back in positions of power, or at least in office, at higher positions, but we still haven't seen that shift. And so yeah, to be honest, I have been surprised that we haven't yet had that.

Adam Hoffman, Head of Middle East Desk: Thank you. Sebastian, would you like to add any final comments to this discussion?

Dr. Sebastian Sons: Yeah, thank you again. Despite the fact that reviving the JCPOA will be, of course, quite a mess and it will be very difficult, I would try to rather close with a more optimistic outlook, so to say. So, when it comes to joint challenges and problems that the region is facing, there are no big differences between the Gulf states and Iran. So there is an overarching understanding that needs to be that climate change, environmental issues, unemployment, drug trafficking, human trafficking, et cetera, the implications of COVID-19, they need to be tackled sooner or later, with or without the JCPOA. And hopefully there will come like a window of opportunity where there will be people on both sides who really think about those concerns, which are mutual concerns.

And, therefore, I think specifically when I look, for instance, into one project I was involved in that is still going on, which is organized by a German think tank, CARPO, at the Gulf Research Center, which is called Tafahum, funded by the federal foreign office, that brings exactly together people from the region, from Iran, from the Gulf States, in order to discuss specific topics of joint interests, such as entrepreneurship, such as migration issues, such as social engagement, et cetera. And, of course, there is an understanding, a common understanding in all of those participants, that all those challenges can only be addressed together.

I know that sounds naive at the moment and of course I see all the obstacles, but on a people-to-people level, there is still some hope and a light at the end of the tunnel. And I think in this regard, also, Europe can play a much bigger, much more influential role.

Adam Hoffman, Head of Middle East Desk: So, thank you for this much more optimistic note to this entire discussion. I would like to thank our participants, everyone, and all of the audience who have stuck with us so far, even after overstepping the timeline for this webinar. So, thank you again for this fascinating discussion. I think it was really interesting to see the various European and American perspectives on these issues and also the Iranian, via Raz speaking from Tel Aviv, to see how Iran might look at these issues.